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1. Introduction
The year 1995 became known as a landmark year in 
contemporary Okinawan history. On September 4 that 
year, three U.S. military personnel raped an Okinawan 
schoolgirl, twelve years of age. This crime was one of the 
events that initiated a newly revived island-wide protest 
movement of Okinawans against the continuous U.S. 
military presence in the prefecture, which for many years 
had gone hand in hand with crime rates above national 
average (Johnson 1999:116–119; Vogt 2003:54). I have 
previously argued that the September gang rape was the 
one event it took in a series of developments to once again 
spark a mass-based protest movement in Okinawa (Vogt 
2003:52–57). What makes this movement of the late 
1990s so special – compared to, for example, the island-
wide protest movement (shimagurumi tōsō) of the 1950s 
or the reversion movement (fukkikyō) of the late 1960s – 
is its character as a multi-issue movement. As such it was 
able to bundle the mobilizing power and resources avail-
able not only to the anti-military and peace groups but 
also the environmental activists, neighborhood associa-
tions and in a most central position the Okinawan women. 
The accessibility of a contentious policy issue to a broad 
group of allies, and the sustainable and potentially trans-
national character of activism around this issue are central 
features of the so-called new social movements (Melucci 
1988:335–338; Vogt 2006:289–291). Once contention 
“produces collective action frames and supportive identi-
ties” (Tarrow 1998:23) new social movements may reach 
a whole new quality of activism. They may be able to 
successfully push for their policy goals, and beyond that 
bring about change in the identity formation of its activ-
ists.
In the piece at hand I will show that the Okinawan 
women’s groups stood at the center of the newly emerging 
protest in the late 1990s and served as key actors when it 
came to call for policy change based on identity formation 
within the prefecture. This might seem surprising given 
the general role of women in Japanese social movements, 
most often confined to far less contentious policy issues 
such as, most prominently, food safety (LeBlanc 1999). 
How then did Okinawan women manage to take on center 
stage in the mass movement of the late 1990s? What were 
their goals of activism and how successful were they in 
pursuing them? I argue that Okinawan women in particu-
lar succeeded in two forms of activism: First, they man-
aged to produce “a collective reality” among protesters 
that went beyond immediate women’s issues “by the con-
vergence and integration of the many elements” (Melucci 
1988: 338) the anti-base movement was and to this day is 
composed of. They, secondly, did so by applying recent 
forms of activism including the transnationalization of 
their actions, which allowed them to form a broad sup-
port basis and to some degree gain independence from the 
narrow political opportunity structures Japan’s political 
system grants to non-traditional political actors.
2. The Year 1995 in Okinawan Politics
In the summer of 1995, the Okinawan public had already 
been highly politicized. That year numerous events were 
held to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Battle 
of Okinawa1 and its many thousand victims. Once again 
the Okinawan public was being confronted with questions 
of life and death, war guilt and Okinawa’s role as host 
to US military personnel in the decades to follow. One 
of the central questions of the public discourses that year 
was how the victimization of Okinawans during the war 
should be portrayed and remembered. Another one was 
to what degree Okinawans – willingly or unwillingly – 
in the years to follow the war supported warfare by pro-
viding the land and infrastructure for U.S. soldiers to be 
trained in combat.2 
Both lines of thought received an additional conten-
tious dimension by, firstly, the opening of “Cornerstone of 
Peace” (heiwa no ishiji), a peace park and museum at the 
Southernmost tip of Okinawa Island, in Mabuni, where 
the Battle of Okinawa came to an end (Kerr 2000:471). 
The peace park’s central commemoration area consists 
of numerous memorial stones taking the shape of ocean 
waves. Inscribed in the memorial stones are the names of 
all affirmed victims of the Battle of Okinawa regardless 
of their nationality or military respectively civilian status 
(OPPMM 2007:10). By taking this inclusive approach 
the Okinawan peace park not only serves as a place of 
commemoration of the sufferings of the war, but also as 
a place to demonstrate “Okinawa’s enduring commitment 
to peace” (Weiner 1994, quoted in Saaler 2004:116), that 
is Okinawa’s commitment to condemn all actions of war 
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regardless of their protagonists. It should not go unno-
ticed, however, that “the fact that the names of Japanese 
combatants stand alongside those of local Okinawans 
has been criticized by Okinawans” (Yonetani 2000). This 
little footnote may serve as a glimpse into the contentious 
dimension of the representation of history in contempo-
rary Okinawa, which unfolded so virulently in the mid-
1990s. 
It was in particular the portrayal of Japanese soldiers 
as the protagonists of war against Okinawan civilians in 
the museum’s exhibits that turned into an unprecedent-
edly heated political dispute among politicians and intel-
lectuals from Okinawa and Japan as well as the concerned 
public. Pictures and scenic portrayals with life-size figures 
suggesting that mass suicides in the caves of Gama during 
the final days of the Battle of Okinawa were in fact forced 
suicides by Japanese soldiers were at the center of the 
debate. While the exhibition in its current form refrains 
from actually showing guns of Japanese soldiers pointing 
at Okinawan civilians, the wording it uses is unmistak-
able and clearly names the atrocities of Japanese soldiers: 
“Inside [the caves], at the hands of Japanese soldiers, 
civilians were massacred, forced to kill themselves and 
each other, and starved to death […].”3 At the center of 
the dispute thus stood and to this day stands “the tensions 
between a Japanese national commemorative history [of 
being a war victim itself, G.V.] and the many ways in 
which Okinawa’s history contradicts it” (Yonetani 2000).
Wartime atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers 
and directed against Okinawan civilians strengthened the 
central line of identity representation among the diverse 
groups of protesters in the mid-1990s. Ōta Masahide, 
known peace activist and former Okinawan Governor 
(1990–1998) continuously stresses that the days of the 
Battle of Okinawa shaped what is now known as Okinawa 
no kokoro (Spirit of Okinawa), the image of Okinawans 
as a peace-loving and anti-war island people (Ōta 1981 
and Ōta 1996). Governor Ōta thus set the tone of how to 
politically frame the gang rape as yet another chapter in 
what appears to be a continuous victimization of Okinawa 
by Japan, in particular the central principle of Japanese 
foreign policy, which relies on the security alliance with 
the United States.
While the connection between the 1995 rape and the 
wartime atrocities to some degree created and strength-
ened the protesters’ common identity, it was a compara-
tively straightforward and mundane event that delivered 
yet another political reason for 1995 to turn into a year 
of heated debate on Okinawa’s role within the Japanese 
nation state: In February 1995, Joseph Nye, Professor for 
International Relations at Harvard University and then 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, published a study on the 
future of the United States’ East-Asia policies. This study, 
which became known as Nye Report, proposed a continu-
ous deployment of at least 100,000 U.S. soldiers in East 
Asia, predominantly in Japan and South-Korea, for an 
additional twenty years, that is until 2015. Nye confirmed 
this stance during a public lecture at the Tokyo Foreign 
Correspondents’ Club in September that year. He argued 
that in light of a rise of China Japan’s position as a close 
ally to the U.S. in East Asia would gain in importance; 
the military alliance between the two nations therefore 
needed to be strengthened (Johnson 1999:120; Vogt 
2003:56). Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation 
and Security between Japan and the U.S. states that “for 
the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and 
the maintenance of international peace and security in 
the Far East, the United States of America is granted the 
use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas 
in Japan” (MOFA 2011). Okinawa, with 0.6 percent of 
Japan’s landmass one of the nation’s smallest prefectures, 
is host to some three quarters of U.S. military personnel 
stationed in Japan, and relocation of U.S. forces to other 
prefectures within Japan has proven next to impossible 
over the past decades (Norimatsu 2011). In fact, due to 
its prominent role in the implementation of Article VI of 
the Security Treaty, Okinawa has become known as “an 
American colony located on Japanese soil” (Johnson 
1999:109). The Nye Report made it perfectly clear that 
an immediate substantial change to this situation – and 
therefore a change also to the realities of day-to-day life 
of Okinawan people and their self-perception as de facto 
contributors to the United State’s global military strategy 
– was more than unlikely.
The friction between Okinawa and Japan over the 
deployment of U.S. soldiers was not a new issue in 1995. 
Yet while the Nye Report confirmed that this will remain 
a contentious policy issue for some time, the reemergence 
of wartime memories and the question of their portrayal 
in contemporary Okinawa once again put Japan-Oki-
nawan relations onto the prefecture’s political agenda. 
Both events produced the grounds for what political sci-
entist Sidney Tarrow (1998:23) calls “collective action 
frames and supportive identities” and what sociologist 
Alberto Melucci (1988:338) coined “a collective reality”; 
they did so by ensuring the Okinawan people that politics 
and policies will not change unless they push for change, 
and by providing them a strong common identity of being 
a victim to Japanese militarism – then and now – thereby 
morally authorizing the Okinawan people to engage in 
political protest in the name of Okinawan pacifism. The 
September gang rape then served as a catalyst helping this 
protests to frame, solidify and emerge.
3. The Boomerang Pattern
The character, strength and prominence of this new pro-
test movement was to a large degree shaped by Okinawan 
women, some of whom would consider themselves 
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feminists, members of the local women’s movement, or 
simply concerned citizens. One can observe an exchange 
between local, national, and transnational levels of con-
tentious engagement by women. Following contemporary 
literature in social movement research, this vital exchange 
is a crucial factor that determines the degree of impact 
a social movement can have on society and politics, and 
thereby its ultimate succes. The theoretical model for this 
line of argumentation is the so-called boomerang pattern 
by political scientists Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sik-
kink. I will briefly introduce this pattern, before applying 
it to my case study of Okinawan women’s participation 
respectively their leading role in the prefecture’s post-
1995 mass movement.
How can new social movements or more gener-
ally civil society organizations (CSO) become suc-
cessful political actors?4 How can they shape policies 
against state pressure, which is inevitable once the CSO 
addresses contentious issues? Recent social movement 
literature calls our attention to the transnationalization of 
CSO activism as one way to overcome the seemingly pre-
destined downfall of a contentious movement in response 
to state pressure.5 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink 
argue that transnationalization of CSO activism “can 
amplify the demands of domestic groups, pry open space 
for new issues, and then echo back these demands into 
the domestic arena” (Keck/Sikkink 1998:13). They call 
the process by which a CSO intensifies its pressure on the 
national government via transnational alliance building 
a boomerang pattern. The boomerang pattern can prove 
particularly useful to CSO in so-called strong states, that 
is in states with a restrictive political opportunity struc-
ture. For CSO in a setting where they are blocked from 
direct lobbying of state authorities, information exchange 
and cooperation with CSO in other states may open up 
new ways of putting pressure on the targeted govern-
ment. Demands for responsiveness from this state can be 
expressed by other states or by intergovernmental organi-
zations – either way, CSO in other states can initiate this 
process of interaction. Figure 1 shows this boomerang 
pattern – developed by Keck and Sikkink (1998:13) and 
modified in wording for this paper. For the purpose of this 
paper, the Japanese state takes up the position as “State 
A,” that is a state with a tight political opportunity struc-
ture, which CSO within this state try to bypass by forming 
transnational alliances with formal and informal political 
actors in the transnational realm.
4. Women’s Protest in Okinawa: Evalu-
ating Effectiveness
The year 1995 brought along a new wave of empower-
ment of women, in society and politics alike. This holds 
true for a global level and for Okinawa in particular. In 
1995, the Fourth World Conference on Women, initi-
ated by the United Nations Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs was held in Beijing, China. This con-
ference addressed issues such as women and poverty, 
education and training of women, women and health, 
violence against women, women in armed conflict, and 
many more.6 Women from Okinawa participated in this 
conference with a delegation of more than seventy mem-
bers. They organized and held eleven workshops dealing 
with, for example, environmental issues and issues of 
discrimination against women in patrilineal societies. The 
workshops organized by the Okinawan delegation also 
explicitly addressed issues of structural military violence 
against women in Okinawa (Bowen Francis 1999:190). 
The leading members of the Okinawan delegation to the 
Beijing Conference also became leading figures in Oki-
nawan women’s activism in the fall of 1995 and thereaf-
ter. The following subsections aim at tracing the effective-
ness of their engagement by placing special focus on its 
transnational dimension. Following Keck and Sikkink’s 
(1998:16–25) model it is in particular four categories that 
need to be studied when aiming at measuring the degree 
of effectiveness of transnational contention of CSO: 
information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics, 
and accountability politics.7 
4.1. Information Politics
Information that flows in advocacy networks, respec-
tively in civil society organizations in general, not only 
provides facts but also testimonies of people whose lives 
have been affected. This information needs to meet two 
criteria in order to serve as a successful political tool. It 
needs to be timely and dramatic, in order to gain attention. 
It also needs to be reliable and well documented, in order 
to be credible.
The information about the 1995 gang rape of an 
Okinawan schoolgirl did not make the big news initially. 
Figure 1: Boomerang Pattern (drawing on Keck/Sikkink 1998: 13)
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Instead, it was the Okinawan delegation of participants 
in the Beijing Conference, who upon return to Okinawa 
learnt about the crime, held a press conference and delib-
erately invited the international media to it. It was only 
then that the crime got international coverage. The group 
also held a central position in organizing the prefecture’s 
largest post-reversion mass demonstration against the 
U.S. military presence, which took place on October 
21.8 The up to then so called Beijing Delegation, in late 
November 1995 constituted itself as a social movement 
group called Okinawan Women Act Against Military Vio-
lence (OWAAMV, Okinawa kichi guntai o yurusanai kōtō 
suru onnatachi no kai). Two of its four mission statements 
deal with providing information, namely spreading infor-
mation about Okinawa in other Japanese prefectures, and 
spreading information about structural military violence 
against women in Okinawa in the U.S. (Bowen Francis 
1999:189–203; Vogt 2003:63). In order to achieve these 
goals, OWAAMV used a broad variety of methods of 
contentious engagement including a thorough mobiliza-
tion of local civic groups.
Already on September 23, 1995, the group initiated 
the Rally of Okinawan women, children, and islanders 
against military violence (Bowen Francis 1999:190). 
Participants to the rally could deliver one-minute state-
ments each sharing their thoughts on women and mili-
tary violence in Okinawa. The rally thus put forward 
personal testimonies of its participants, providing a forum 
for solidarity and for the creation of a common identity 
and common reality that served as bond throughout the 
coming weeks of activism. Also, by explicitly mention-
ing “islanders” in the title of the rally, what started as a 
women’s group opened itself to the general public. The 
two central figures of the mass protest in its early days, 
Takazato Suzuyo and Itokazu Keiko, with this Septem-
ber rally managed to strengthen the internal identity of 
the group and at the same time broaden its appeal to Oki-
nawan citizens in general. The expansion of their scope 
of activism was made possible in particular by the promi-
nent status of the two leading figures. Both women were 
and to this day are known activists for women’s rights 
and key members of the Okinawan progressive political 
block. In 1995, Takazato served as a member of the Naha 
city assembly and Itokazu as a member of the Okinawa 
prefectural parliament.9 
Another outstanding initiative in information politics 
shall be highlighted here: In coalition with Japanese wom-
en’s groups such as the New Japan Women’s Association, 
OWAAMV supported a full page bilingual advertisement 
in The New York Times which was run in January 1996. 
The English title and subtitle read: “The Women of Japan 
Appeal to The Peace-Loving People of The World. The 
only way to prevent another rape case of an Okinawa girl 
is to remove all U.S. bases from Japan. Let us achieve a 
conflict-free, peaceful 21st century” (The New York Times 
1996/01/29:A11). This advertisement brought enormous 
publicity to the group and paved the way for two trips of 
OWAAMV activists to the U.S., which took place in 1996 
and 1998. These so-called “Okinawa Women’s America 
Peace Caravans” not only served to spread information 
on the issue of structural military violence in Okinawa, 
but also extended their effects into the fields of leverage 
and accountability politics: National U.S. newspapers 
such as The Los Angeles Times and The Washington Post 
reported on the Okinawan women’s delegation’s trips and 
their meetings with U.S. activists, researchers and assem-
bly men and women. During their second trip, the Oki-
nawa Women’s America Peace Caravan delegation also 
participated in a grassroots meeting of women’s groups 
from the U.S., the Philippines, Korea and Puerto Rico on 
military and environmental devastation (Bowen Francis 
1999:195–196; OWAAMV 1999:2; 61–76).
4.2. Symbolic Politics
The political usage of symbols foremostly serves two 
goals. Symbols help constructing a collective identity 
among activists and potential supporters, thus strengthen-
ing the internal structure of a CSO. They also assist the 
process of issue framing. Through symbols the rights and 
wrongs of an issue are often defined respectively shaped. 
Symbols thus serve as catalyst for the growth of a CSO.
The year 1995 not only brought a significant strength-
ening of Okinawa’s women’s movement respectively its 
female CSO activism, it also reshaped the nature of the 
CSO coalition that carried and still carries out the so called 
Okinawa Struggle, that is the protest against the ongo-
ing U.S. military presence in the prefecture. The central 
agenda of the Okinawa Struggle after 1995 shifted from 
issues such as access to land or environmental protection 
to human rights, in particular to women’s rights. This line 
of thought – women’s rights being human rights – is the 
essence of all the issues central to Okinawan women’s 
activism of that time. This activism generally evolved 
around three issues: violence against women (josei e 
no bōryoku), human rights (jinken), and peace and war 
(heiwa to sensō). By stressing the importance of women’s 
rights, in particular their right to bodily security, Takazato 
Suzuyo, a former phone counselor to women in need of 
psychological and/or practical assistance after falling 
victim to sexual crime, utilized the September gang rape 
as a symbol powerful enough to serve as a catalyst to the 
contentious political atmosphere of 1995. It needs to be 
noted that Takazato did so in a most humble and cautious 
way, always putting the girl’s right to anonymity and the 
immediate needs of the victim first (Takazato 1999). As 
– next to OWAAMV – second spin-off to the Beijing Del-
egation, in late October 1995 the Rape Emergency Inter-
vention Counseling Center Okinawa (REICO) emerged.10 
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Takazato founded this group, in order to provide immedi-
ate assistance to victims of rape stressing the hands-on 
responsibility CSO in Japan so often take up more vividly 
than political advocacy.11 
The year 1995 gang rape became a symbol to the 
quickly mobilized masses. During the October 21 rally 
in Kaihin Park, Ginowan-city, which drew some 85,000 
participants (Ryūkyū Shinpō 1995/10/22), Governor 
Ōta in his speech also made a reference to the issue of 
women’s rights being human rights when he opened his 
speech with an apology. He apologized for having failed 
to protect the human rights of the girl who was raped on 
September 4, 1995.12 Numerous politicians of all politi-
cal blocks and nationality followed suit, and in their 
speeches – obviously pursuing divergent political goals 
– continued to refer to the 1995 rape as a more general 
symbolic rape of Okinawa. Most recently Tanaka Satoshi, 
head of the Okinawa Defense Bureau, was quoted saying: 
“Would you give a prior warning when you are about to 
rape someone?” (The Wall Street Journal 2011/11/29). 
He was answering to a question of why the Bureau had 
not set a formal deadline for an environmental assess-
ment report on the relocation plans of Futenma Marine 
Corps Air Station from Ginowan-city to the less densely 
populated areas of Northern Okinawa Island, apparently 
himself understanding this political decision to in fact be 
a criminal act.
Cultural anthropologist Linda Angst in her research 
puts the political dimension of the frequent references 
to the September 4 rape as follows: “the rape of a child 
is transformed into the rape of the body politic.” (Angst 
2003:138). The rape moreover became a symbol for Oki-
nawan subjugation within the Japanese nation state. Ironi-
cally it thereby strengthened Okinawan CSO engage-
ment, which embraces the concept of identity politics and 
positions itself in resistance towards state pressures.
4.3. Leverage Politics
Measuring the political effectiveness of a CSO includes 
tracing some policy change by so-called target actors of a 
CSO. That are mostly governments, financial institutions 
or private businesses. In order to gain influence, CSO 
seek material and moral leverage over their target actors. 
Material leverage links the issue in question to money and 
goods; moral leverage includes the so-called mobilization 
of shame.
The above mentioned one-page advertisement in 
The New York Times which OWAAMV initiated in coop-
eration with Japanese women’s associations, offered sta-
tistical data on crimes committed by U.S. military per-
sonnel in Okinawa. It concludes the presentation of this 
data with the following question: “Is it a right thing to 
station armed forces in foreign countries and make other 
people suffer?” (The New York Times 1996/01/29:A11). 
OWAAMV is putting moral leverage on its target actors, 
that is the United States’ and Japan’s national govern-
ments who both support the current system of forward 
deployment of U.S. soldiers in Okinawa. By doing 
so both governments willingly accept the fact that the 
national security of both nations, although in particular of 
Japan, comes at the price of human security, in particular 
women’s security in Okinawa (Takazato 1999). During 
mass demonstrations co-organized by OWAAMV and 
human chains around military bases in Okinawa, which 
they helped to stage media-savvy, as well as in meet-
ings with U.S. politicians during both Peace Caravans, 
the women activists of OWAAMV made fervent use of 
moral leverage politics as the The New York Times adver-
tisement might have exemplified.
On the other hand, they had no access to mate-
rial leverage politics. There was no monetary good 
OWAAMV could have threatened to withhold from one 
of its target actors. They did, however, strongly support 
Governor Ōta Masahide when in late September 1995 he 
decided to engage in material leverage politics by with-
holding his signature on the land lease contracts. While 
Article VI of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty grants the 
right to the U.S. to use Japanese soil for forward deploy-
ment of their military units, how this soil is being acquired 
is a domestic policy issue in Japan. The Land Acquistion 
Law (tochi shūyō-hō) stipulates that the Japanese gov-
ernment can ask local land owners to rent their land for 
military purposes; in case the individual land owners 
do not comply, the duty lies with the local executives 
and ultimately the prefectural governor to sign on their 
behalf. On September 28, 1995 Governor Ōta announced 
that he would no longer carry out his duty to sign land 
lease contracts on behalf of the Okinawan citizens (Vogt 
2003:68–79). He argued that it was not right to force the 
peaceful Okinawans, even 50 years after the end of the 
war, to continue living with this kind of overwhelming 
presence of military personnel and facilities in the pre-
fecture. In his explanatory note Ōta clearly referred to the 
Okinawan Pacifism – in his words the Okinawa no kokoro 
(Spirit of Okinawa) – as a philosophical guidance for his 
political actions. Two years later, after he had lost to the 
national government in Tōkyō in 1996, while reviewing 
the struggle he fought he commented on the rape of Sep-
tember 4 saying that: “I didn’t particularly want to use 
this issue to raise local people to oppose the presence of 
US military bases on Okinawa but it has helped us mobil-
ise people.” (Ōta 1997:79). While the Okinawa women’s 
movement did not have access to material leverage poli-
tics themselves, they had a powerful ally in Governor 
Ōta who did not shy away from making use of material 
leverage when he refused to sign the land lease contracts 
thereby temporarily illegalizing U.S. military usage of 
Okinawan soil.
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4.4. Accountability Politics
Accountability politics is a follow-up on leverage poli-
tics. CSO try to put moral and material leverage on target 
actors, strong enough to have them make public state-
ments on certain policy changes. Governments under 
pressure may try to save face by closing the distance 
between discourse and practice.
One of the most difficult tasks in social science is to 
track down in a credible way which factors trigger which 
outcomes. When I argue that OWAAMV and the women 
in Okinawan CSO in general played a central role in revi-
talizing and reshaping the prefecture’s contentious poli-
tics in the mid- to late-1990s, I also argue that some of the 
political impacts this island-wide protest had, find their 
origin in OWAAMV’s activism. And while it is hard to 
argue that one particular statement of a target actor was 
made in response to one particular doing of OWAAMV, 
what can be identified is that the pressure on the U.S. 
government and Japan’s national government to some-
how deal with the protests in Okinawa over the course 
of the fall and winter of 1995/96 had risen significantly. 
OWAAMV managed to create a tightly knit network of 
activists and general public in which information flew 
freely. This is quite remarkable for social activism before 
the times of wide-spread use of new media technol-
ogy, when CSO were confined to the usage of so-called 
mini media such as pamphlets and speaker trucks, while 
the existing mass media were controlled by those who 
most often were the actual target actors of CSO activ-
ism (Groth 1996). The women activists furthermore were 
successful in strengthening the internal coherence of the 
movement by enabling citizens to fully take part in it with 
their own individual testimonies. They also managed to 
broaden the movement’s appeal to other groups within 
the prefecture such as environmentalists, and to trans-
national actors such as women’s groups in the United 
States. Holding and using a powerful symbol – the “rape 
of the body politic” (Angst 2003: 138) – was most valu-
able and created the basis for a strong moral leverage the 
group was able to put on the political elites in Japan and 
the United States. Their lack of access to material lever-
age was compensated for by a close alliance to Governor 
Ōta who not only had the means of material leverage at 
his hand, but was more than willing to utilize them and 
early on in the struggle decided to refrain from signing 
any more land lease contracts on behalf of the Okinawan 
citizens. It is fair to argue that this overall pressure sce-
nario triggered a public statement, which – from a CSO 
perspective – must be understood as a huge success in 
accountability politics.
On April 12, 1996 then Prime Minister of Japan 
Hashimoto Ryūtarō and then US-ambassador to Japan, 
Walter Mondale, held a joint press conference, which was 
broadcasted live on Japanese television. They announced 
that Futenma Marine Corps Air Station in Ginowan-
city was to be closed down in order to ease the burden 
on the local people. Military units were to be relocated 
to a place outside the densely populated Ginowan area. 
This announcement came as a preview to the interme-
diate report of the so-called Special Action Committee 
on Okinawa (SACO), which was released on April 15, 
1996. SACO is a U.S.-Japan committee launched as 
early as November 1995 in order to propose measures of 
how to reduce the burden on Okinawan people that they 
bear under the bilateral security treaty. The SACO final 
report was published in December 1996, but the main 
issues were already released in the intermediate report 
of April that year. SACO’s proposals comprised of four 
main points: return land, adjust training and operational 
procedures, reduce noise, and improve Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA)13 procedures (Vogt 2003:247–253). 
All proposed measures were direct answers to some 
of OWAAMV’s and other Okinawan CSO’s demands 
on how to improve the living conditions for local Oki-
nawans. A causal connection between these demands and 
the target actors’ response seems likely.
And yet, the story told is only one of partial suc-
cess. Okinawan CSO ever since the April 12 press con-
ference and the subsequent release of the SACO report 
have tried to make a push for accountability politics by 
pointing their fingers onto the still existing difference 
between discourse and reality, that is the action goals 
SACO formulated in great detail on the one hand and 
the continuous forward deployment of massive military 
units in Okinawa, including the usage of the contested 
Futenma Marine Corps Air Station, on the other. In 
other words, Okinawa’s so-called base problems (kichi 
mondai) still exist. It is in particular the issue of Futenma 
Marine Corps Air Station, which has taken up the role as 
a new symbol of Okinawan contentious politics and civil 
society’s engagement around it. Any attempt of relocat-
ing the facility so far has been stopped by fierce political 
protest from local governments and civil society activists 
in the proposed areas of destination, most prominently 
in Henoko, Nago-city (Vogt 2005b). A 2006 Roadmap 
plan which is based on the original SACO report stipu-
lates “that eight thousand Okinawa Marines and their 
nine thousand family members would be moved to 
Guam by 2014, and V-shaped runways would be built on 
Henoko, as a replacement base for Futenma” (Norimatsu 
2011). In February 2009, only months before the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) was elected out of office, the 
Roadmap plan was finalized and made a binding con-
tract to the successor in office, Prime Minister Hatoyama 
Yukio of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The 
failure to solve this so-called Futenma issue – although 
prominently announced during the election campaign in 
summer 2009 – triggered Hatoyama’s resignation in June 
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2010 and marked yet another deep disappointment for 
Okinawans who had placed their hopes for policy change 
in this first non-LDP coalition government since the mid-
1990s.14 
5. Conclusion
The case study at hand on OWAAMV’s effectiveness as 
central actor within the Okinawan mass protest movement 
of the late-1990s showed that this particular CSO indeed 
succeeded in two ways: Firstly, it portrayed the Septem-
ber 4 gang rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl as a symbol of 
Okinawa’s so to say unjust subordination within Japan’s 
political system and of the continuous suppression of 
Okinawa’s Spirit (Okinawa no kokoro), that is to say its 
peacefulness, by two military powers, namely Japan and 
the United States. By framing the crime against a local 
girl this way, a political dimension beyond the level of 
day-to-day politics became inherent in the CSO’s activ-
ism. This dimension was powerfully played out in moral 
leverage politics, in material leverage politics through the 
alliance with Governor Ōta, and ultimately contributed to 
the island-wide pressure for accountability politics. Sec-
ondly, OWAAMV, a group of local women who gathered 
around Takazato Suzuyo and Itokazu Keiko, two promi-
nent female local politicians, lifted their activism beyond 
the local and the national level aiming at creating alliances 
with formal and informal political actors abroad. This 
transnational alliance building contributed to the strong 
standing of the group within Japan’s domestic policy 
arena of the late-1990s, and by doing so contributed to 
the partial success of the larger protest movement. It will 
not be over the top to argue that OWAAMV had a share 
in the two national governments’ decision to appoint the 
Special Action Committee on Okinawa and have it pro-
pose measurements of easing the manifold burdens on the 
local population.
Yet, this study also laid open the limits of CSO activ-
ism in Japan, representative for many strong states with a 
tight political opportunity structure that limits the scope of 
action of informal political actors (“State A” in Figure 1). 
A solid coalition between citizens and substate level poli-
ticians in Okinawa managed to pressure Japan’s national 
government to a degree that surely could not have been 
in the state’s interest. While this unlikely local coalition 
may also have succeeded in forming various transnational 
alliances, this does not yet allow any conclusions as to 
the degree of responsiveness of strong states toward pres-
sure. Strong states might just “sit it out,” and wait for the 
national and transnational pressure to subside. This is in 
particular a likely scenario as long as the transnational 
pressure is not proposed by an actor, which “State A” 
would deem a highly important one. In the case at hand, 
the only actor of a relevance high enough for the Japa-
nese government to change their policy would probably 
have been the U.S. government, which, however, had no 
intention to side with the anti-military movement in Oki-
nawa. Other actors, such as CSO or local politicians, and 
intellectuals in “State B” proved not influential enough to 
change “State A’s” policies.
However, not even once “State A” changed its gov-
ernment parties to an administration sympathetic with 
Okinawa’s anti-military struggle, and would therefore 
have been likely to soften the “A” domestic blockage 
between the state and its citizens – and to some degree 
was about to do so –, did policy change occur. If Prime 
Minister Hatoyama in his above mentioned reflective 
assessment was indeed right, the reason for his failure to 
bring about policy change in the Okinawa issue was that 
he as Prime Minister was not a political actor powerful 
enough to fight the bureaucracy’s political will. If that 
was indeed true, the study at hand had contributed another 
piece to the puzzle about where policy making in Japan 
actually occurs: either within the Nagatachō bureaucracy 
or in Washington.
Notes
* An earlier version of this paper was presented and fruitfully 
discussed at the 5th International Conference on Okinawan 
Studies (Ca’Foscari University of Venice, September 2006). 
1 Ōta Masahide (1999:13) understands March 26, 1945, the day 
U.S. forces landed on Kerama Island, as the beginning of the 
Battle of Okinawa, while generally April 1 and the landing of 
U.S. troops on Okinawa Island is given as its start day. The 
Battle came to an end with the suicide of General Ushijima 
Mitsuru on June 23, 1945. 
2 Since the reversion of 1972 this has included members of 
Japan’s Self-Defense Forces.
3 In Japanese: “Kō no naka de ha, Nihon hei ni yoru jūmin 
gyakusatsu ya, kyōsei ni yoru shūdanshi, gashi ga ari, […]”. 
Both the English and Japanese quotes are taken from the bilin-
gual museum guide (OPPMM 2007:86). 
4 In the following I will use the more inclusive term “civil society 
organizations” (CSO), which includes not only well-organized 
groups such as new social movements but also the broad variety 
of less organized, informal groups, which are of vivid impor-
tance to Japan’s non-state non-market sector (Pekkanen 2006).
5 This is a reference to Sidney Tarrow’s model of “cycles of con-
tention” which states that every social movement undergoes 
a mobilization phase inevitably followed by a demobilization 
phase (Tarrow 1998:141–160).
6 Official documents of the conference can be accessed from a 
website hosted by The United Nations Entity for Gender Equal-
ity and the Empowerment of Women (2011).
7 The introductory paragraphs of the following four subsec-
tions provide explanatory remarks on the political dimensions 
of these categories. They are drawn from Keck and Sikkink 
(1998: 16–25).
8 See 4.2. for more detailed information on this particular rally.
9 Both women still are active in politics: Takazato Suzuyo in 
2004 ran for mayor in Naha city, but was defeated in what 
turned out a close race. These days she devotes herself to CSO 
activism for women’s rights and the Okinawa peace movement 
(Vogt 2005a). Itokazu Keiko has served as a member to Japan’s 
House of Councilors since 2004; in 2006, she (unsuccessfully) 
ran for governorship of Okinawa Prefecture.
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10 Next to OWAAMV and REICO a third group emerged out 
of the original members of the Beijing Delegation. Tengan 
Mayumi and three other activists founded Young Voices, a 
group that provided a forum to Okinawan women in their 20s 
and 30s aiming at discussing sociopolitical issues of contempo-
rary Okinawa (Keyso 2000:122).
11 See Pekkanen (2006) for an elaboration of this observation, 
which only partially holds true for the prefecture of Okinawa.
12 In Japanese: “Mazu gyōsei no sekininsha toshite taisetsuna 
osanai kodomo no ningen toshite no sonken o mamoru koto ga 
dekinakatta koto ni tsuite, kokoro no soko kara owabi shitai” 
(Okinawa Mondai Henshū Iinkai 1995:37)
13 The SOFA procedures define the legal status of the United 
States Forces Japan (USFJ) and their relatives, and the so-
called host nation support Japan provides to the USFJ.
14 Hatoyama himself accused Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the Ministry of Defense to have sabotaged his plans for 
policy change: “MOFA and MOD, while they should have been 
thinking through the base transfer issue with me, instead chose 
to give priority to what had been agreed with the US (a new 
base in Okinawa).” (Norimatsu 2011). 
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